Udayana's theory of inference in his Kiranavali
Takanori SUZUKI 1. Prasastapada, the author of the PDhS, mentions twice the theory of the three conditions that inferential mark should satisfy (trairupya), in which the word "wellknown (prasiddha)" is used for the second condition1). Udayana gives a particular meaning to the word "prasiddha" in his Kir, a commentary of the PDhS, which is that inferential mark is well-known as such that it has firm invariable concomitance, or as such that it is associated with firmly cognized invariable concomitance2).
The comment given by Udayana, however, seems to have an apparent contradiction if we hold that inferential mark has vyapti, invariable concomitance when it satisfies the second and the third conditions, that is to say, "sapakse sattvam" and "vipaksat vvavrttih". Since vvapti is not considered to be established until inferential mark satisfies these two conditions, the word "vyapti" should not have been used in the very trairupya theory if Udayana had held that the two conditions could be sufficient for establishment of vyapti. It may be more legitimate to assume that Udayana had a specific intention, than to assume that he made a logical error, as he gives the same comment in other places3). The Vvomavati and the Nvayakandali, the other two main commentaries of the PDhS, do not give this kind of comment. This paper aims to clarify Udayana's intention in using the word "prasiddha" .
2. Later Nyaya-Vaisesika texts define the instrument of inferential knowledge as the consideration of inferential mark (lirigaparamarsa), which is regarded as the knowledge that the property qualified by invariable concomitance is present in a particular location (vyaptivisistapaksadharmatajnana). According to their theory, the agent of inference should first grasp vyapti in a particular location (sapaksa, similar instance). After that, he sees, in another particular location different from a sapaksa (paksa, inferential subject), the inferential mark, from which the remembrance about vyapti arises. Finally, when he cognizes the inferential mark again in the paksa as
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It seems clear here that Udayana has attempted to site this lingaparamarsa theory along with the word "drdavyaptikataya" when commenting on the Prasastapada's statements. His first comment on them, "inferential mark is nothing but what is well-known again (lingam punar prasiddham eva)", must be intended to refer to lingaparaniarsa 4) We will next see Prasastapada's statement on hetvabhasas, along with the quotation from the VS 3-1-10 5). Udayana identifies asat and sandigdha in the VS with asiddha and anaikanika respectively. Asiddha is regarded as a kind of hetvabhasas that is opposite to the first condition of the trairupya theory,that is, "paksadharmata", and anaikantika is regarded as such that it lacks the third condition. As for apras-
Udayana's theory of inference in his Kiranavali (T. SUZUKI) iddha, Udayana puts it on a particular position. According to his interpretation , it includes not only viruddha, which is opposed to the second condition , but also prakaranasama and kalatvayapadista. It is well known that prakaranasama and kalatvayapadista respectively corresponds to satpratipaksa and badhita in most of the Nyaya-Vaisesika texts, and also that being free from the each fallacy which lies in satpratipaksa and badhita (asatpratipaksatva, abadhitatva) is considered to be the fourth and the fifth conditions. Udayana says that the word "prasiddha" should be regarded to exclude prakaranasama and kalatvayapadista because the word "aprasiddha" includes both fallacious reasons6). Thus, the word "prasiddha" in Prasastapada's theory of trairupya includes the fourth and the fifth conditions as well as the second condition. For Udayana, that which is required for the occurrence of inferential knowledge is not only the three conditions but also the other two. Inferential mark can be a "prasiddha" , such that it is associated with vyapti, only when all the five conditions are satisfied.
4. The following points have been made clear. Adding the word "drdavvaptikataya"
to "prasiddha", Udayana refers to the theory of lingaparamarsa and that of the grasp of vyapti based on non-perception of upadhi, and joins the fourth and the fifth conditions to the three conditions of inferential mark. These points clearly
show that Udayana regarded that the theory of trairupya is not enough to define the valid inferential mark. He dared to place a special significance on the word " prasiddha" to assert the above theories of the Nyaya-Vasesikas logic, which differs from the Buddhist logic based on the trairupya theory.
